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In this contribution the authors show that development assistance targeting reproductive 
health overwhelmingly concentrates on HIV/AIDS at the expense of family planning 
elements. Data on financial contributions disbursed by governments and private 
foundations are used as collected by the Resource Flows project as initiated by 
UNFPA/NIDI. The current allocation of aid does not accord well with the plans made in 
Cairo at the International Conference on Population and Development in 1994. Part of the 
explanation is that future health needs are difficult to predict, but it also shows how 
strong the influence of one donor, i.e. the United States, is in this setup. The landscape of 
population assistance is a highly volatile one, brought about not only by political issues 
like the Global Gag Rule, but also issues of collective action design as assistance under 
the heading of the Millennium Development Goals crowds out family planning. A 
complicating factor is that development assistance for reproductive health is at some 
points ill-adjusted towards the needs of developing countries. 
 
*  Forthcoming in: A. Kulczycki (ed.), Critical Issues in Reproductive Health, Springer, 




“All countries should take steps to meet the family planning needs of their populations as 
soon as possible and should, in all cases by the year 2015, seek to provide universal 
access to a full range of safe and reliable family planning methods and to related 
reproductive health services which are not against the law.” (UN, 1995, par. 7.16) With 
this emphatic statement, 179 governments expressed their commitment to the Programme 
of Action (PoA) at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) 
held in Cairo, 1994. Targets were also set for funding the costs of implementing the PoA, 
with donor governments promising to finance one-third of the total amount of resource 
flows needed for population activities in developing countries. The ICPD PoA was 
lauded with praise and depicted as “a turning point in humanity” and “a quantum leap to 
a higher state of energy” (McIntosh and Finkle 1995).  
Today, the program is near its end date and commentators, policy makers and 
advocates are worried by the unbalanced attention given to specific population issues 
within the ICPD agenda, and by the gap between the actual disbursements of funds and 
those that were promised. Specifically, many within the family planning movement are 
concerned by the dominance of STDs/HIV/AIDS programs
1
  Ever since its approval, the  PoA has been plagued by many of the same kinds of 
problems that bedevil international development aid,  aptly depicted by William Easterly 
in his book ‘The White Man’s Burden’ (2006).  In designing and executing the grand 
plans of bringing welfare and development to poorer countries, the only thing which 
seems to count is the movement of money. In the social engineering mindset of planners, 
the money should flow to places where the reproductive health status of women is 
 and the comparative neglect 
of family planning and other aspects of reproductive health care in the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (cf. Cleland and Sinding, 2005). As Steven Sinding has 
stated: “If you’re not an MDG, you’re not on the agenda. If you’re not a line item, you’re 
out of the game” (cited in Crossette, 2005: 77). 
                                                 
1  The ICPD PoA frames all funding in for this category under the heading of Sexually Transmitted 
Diseases (STDs) including HIV/AIDS. Throughout the text we will use the shorter term HIV/AIDS and 
wherever UN figures are presented on HIV/AIDS, these also include STDs. 2 
 
threatened and family planning needs cannot be met due to a lack of resources. In this 
chapter, we will take up the question of how the funding efforts to achieve the ICPD’s 
goals have fared since 1994, and what lessons can be learned from this experience so far.  
 
2. Tracking the good intentions of donors 
Compromises have to be drawn at population conferences, whose overall good intentions 
are often stated in such high spirits that some disappointment is inevitable in the years 
that follow, when attempts are made to put the grand ambitions of conference 
negotiations into practice. To understand the PoA, one first needs to consider the 
diverging views on population policies and the different schools of thought that surfaced 
at the Cairo conference (Potts, 2004).  These ranged from groups traditionally opposed to 
organized family planning programs such as the Vatican, which continued its hard-line 
stand against any form of ‘artificial contraception’ and condemned the use of condoms; 
to those who had launched national family planning programs in many developing 
countries during the 1960s and thereafter, and who continued to maintain their concern 
about rapid population growth and emphasized that fertility would fall rapidly if only the 
unmet need for family planning was met in a respectful way. Other groups were also 
present at Cairo.  They included the women’s health advocates who focused on the needs 
of the individual woman and downplayed demographic forces, often portraying family 
planning programs as coercive; as well as groups emphasizing the inequalities between 
the global North and South and the need to redistribute the world’s wealth more equally. 
Given such diverse views on population policies, the ICPD achieved a remarkable degree 
of consensus. Its PoA underscored the heavy burden of social and cultural injustice that 
falls on many women in the world.  The conference considered sexually transmitted 
diseases (STDs) and HIV/AIDS, condemned female genital mutilation, and set family 
planning in a broad context of reproductive health care. 
But how has the PoA fared in the terms that matter most for the citizens receiving 
the aid? It is almost impossible to review the entire field of reproductive health and the 
progress that has been made. Instead, we focus on the three most important elements of 
reproductive health and, specifically, discuss developments in: (1) family planning, 
which is key to increasing household wealth and to improving overall reproductive 3 
 
health; (2) maternal health, which is central to the health of women during pregnancy, 
childbirth and the postpartum period; and (3) HIV/AIDS, which destroys not only the 
human capital of those infected but also, as a potent infectious disease, involves a host of 
global public governance and program design problems in the provision of a global 
public good that entails more sophistication than top-down development planners seem 
ready to admit (Sandler, 2004). 
In general, contraceptive use has increased over time, even in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), and yet despite the considerable progress made during the 1990s in particular, 
services are still finding it hard to reach the poorest families. Table 1 presents some data 
from the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) program on how the demand for modern 
contraceptives across families of different wealth statuses is satisfied in the various 
regions of the world. In most countries the wealthiest 20 percent (Q5 in Table 1) of 
families  are using family planning when they want no more children or want to space 
children at least 2 years apart. More recent evidence (Bernstein, 2006) shows that the 
progress continues, but the poorest families (Q1) in Sub-Saharan Africa still lag behind 
and less than a third of the poorest families can satisfy their demand for family planning.  
 
HERE TABLE 1 
 
The importance of this failure to access family planning in this part of the world becomes 
evident by taking account of the robust evidence on the relationship between 
contraceptive use and fertility  Experience shows that as contraceptive prevalence rises, 
so the total fertility rate falls. A host of studies has documented the spread of fertility 
decline throughout the developing world, including SSA.  Recently, however, concerns 
have emerged that the ongoing fertility decline has stalled in a number of African 
countries. For example, Ezeh et al. (2009) examined the stalling fertility transitions in 
four Eastern African countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe) over two 
decades. They found that fertility decline has been highly selective among specific 
subgroups of women, especially the most educated and urban, whereas the fertility rate 
actually rose for women with little or no formal education. Acceptance of family 
planning as a legitimate way of controlling births may have even fallen; the proportion of 4 
 
Kenyan youth (15-19 years) who disapproved of family planning increased between 1998 
and 2003 from 13 to 22 percent (Ezeh et al. 2009, p. 3005). 
Maternal health is the second major element of reproductive health that we shall 
consider. Although motherhood is widely seen as a positive and fulfilling experience, for 
too many women in developing countries, it is also associated with suffering, ill-health 
and even death. In May 2008, WHO’s Executive Director acknowledged that progress 
had stalled towards reaching the MDGs, particularly MDG 5 (improving maternal 
health), and that continued progress would be “slow and uneven”. Beyond the major 
direct causes of maternal morbidity and mortality (hemorrhage, infection, high blood 
pressure, unsafe abortion, and obstructed labor) maternal health may also be 
compromised by harmful behaviors. In Africa these include female genital mutilation. 
The most recent prevalence data indicate that 91.5 million African girls and women 
above 9 years old are currently living with the consequences of female 
genital mutilation (Yoder and Khan, 2008); and according to a consortium of health 
agencies, 100 to 140 million girls and women worldwide have undergone female genital 
mutilation/cutting, with more than 3 million girls at risk for cutting each year in Africa 
alone (WHO, 2008).  The measurement and monitoring of maternal health are difficult, 
but we know that the divergence in maternal mortality rates throughout the world is very 
large.  Although the most recent estimates indicated an overall decline in maternal deaths, 
the lifetime risk of dying from pregnancy and childbirth ranges from 1 in 4300 in 
developed countries, to as high as 1 in 31 in SSA (Hogan et al., 2010).  Many more 
women are estimated to suffer pregnancy-related illnesses (9.5 million), near-miss events 
(1.4 million), and other potentially devastating consequences after birth (20 million long-
term disabilities) (Fillippi et al., 2006).  Access to antenatal and delivery care received 
varies widely. Also, about 19 million unsafe abortions are practiced annually worldwide 
and were estimated to account for 68,000  (or 13 percent of all) maternal deaths in 2000. 
The prevalence of unsafe abortion differs across regions and is higher in South America, 
many areas of SSA, and South Asia.  Progress, however, is slow to achieve. Although 
some progress occurred in Latin American and the Caribbean over the period 1990-2000, 
most developing countries saw no appreciable change in their rates of unsafe abortion 
(Grimes et al., 2006).  5 
 
  Finally, HIV/AIDS is the element of reproductive health which has received most 
attention over the period discussed. For 2009 it was estimated that 31-35 million people 
globally were living with HIV, 2.6 million people were newly infected (down from a 
peak of 3.2 million in 1997) and approximately 1.8 million people died from AIDS-
related causes (down from a peak of 2.1 million in 2004) (UNAIDS 2010). The 
prevalence rate varies greatly, from 0.1 % among adults aged 15-49 years in East Asia to 
5 % in SSA, which continues to be the region most affected by the pandemic.  It is still 
hard to speak of major progress in this field, but it is encouraging that the global AIDS 
pandemic appears to have stabilized. However, levels of new infections remain high and 
the number of people living with HIV worldwide has increased given the progress made 
in reducing mortality rates among those infected. 
 
3. Whatever happened to Cairo’s good intentions? 
The ICPD’s participants set themselves an ultimatum (the year 2015) for achieving the 
goals they had agreed upon in Cairo. Much has happened between 1994 and 2010, but it 
does not take an expert’s eye to see that the ambitions of 1994 have not been realized and 
will probably also not be realized by the year 2015. The developed nations are trying to 
cope with the huge financial problems that have resulted in the aftermath of the 2008-
2009 economic crisis; and given that population assistance is highly elastic with respect 
to income developments within donor countries (cf. Van Dalen, 2008), the financing of 
reproductive health aid is bound to be affected negatively. It is timely, therefore, to take 
stock of what may underlie the gap between intentions and actions. To unravel the 
reasons for the divergence between Cairo’s ambitions and the day-to-day practice in 
matters of reproductive health, it may help to look at a number of different causes, 
ranging from the probable and simple to the more complex causes of development 
failure. 
 
3.1 No sense of urgency 
The first and most plausible reason goes to the heart of the issue of population assistance. 
Although women’s reproductive rights figure prominently in the ICPD agenda, in the 
minds of decision makers, the concerns of economic growth, sound fiscal policy, and the 6 
 
miracle of making markets work, all outrank the more abstract issues of reproductive 
rights or reproductive health when thinking about development. As Peter Piot, the former 
head of UNAIDS, has once said: “I asked myself what political leaders really care about. 
The truth is, it’s not health. It’s economics and security. Health is what they talk about if 
there’s money left at the end of the day.” For a long time, the Washington Consensus 
(Williamson, 1990) formed the dominant frame of mind, certainly during the 1990s
2
It is understandable that economic policy makers are enchanted by an agenda 
formulated in economic terms. It may be somewhat puzzling, however, that demographic 
experts are less convinced about the case for population policies, including family 
planning programs, or about the oft-cited need to bring global population growth in line 
with the carrying capacity of the earth. In 2009, demographers of the International Union 
for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) were asked a range of questions (Van 
Dalen and Henkens, 2011).
.    
3
 
  Table 2 shows their spread of opinions about the sense of 
urgency (or the lack thereof) they ascribed to the Malthusian concern with population 
growth outpacing the carrying capacity of the earth.  Approximately half of the 
demographers did not agree with the statement: “The current size of the world population 
exceeds the carrying capacity of the earth.”   
HERE TABLE 2 
 
This agnostic attitude is not without its consequences. We also tried to capture the 
attitude towards government intervention in reducing above replacement-level fertility 
rates and their preference of world population growth. By and large one can say that 
those who firmly disagree that the world population exceeds the carrying capacity of the 
earth are far more set on a laissez faire population policy (28 percent would never 
interfere in countries facing above replacement fertility), and they are also the ones who 
                                                 
2  The term “Washington Consensus” was first coined by John Williamson to describe the policy 
prescriptions promoted for crisis-ridden developing countries by Washington, D.C.-based institutions like 
the IMF, World Bank, and the US Treasury Department.  It refers more generally to an orientation towards 
free market policies followed by both advanced and emerging economies. This mindset dominated 
economic thinking and the views of many politicians and journalists during the 1990s, but then ended with 
the outbreak of the 2008-09 financial crisis. 
3 The response rate was relatively high for such an expert survey (40%) and included demographers from 
all corners of the world. 7 
 
want the world population to grow. The converse relationship applies to those who firmly 
agree with this Malthusian statement:  virtually all of this group is in favor of government 
intervention and 76 percent wants a smaller world population. In short, if the low level of 
consensus on this particular issue among experts is also present among policy makers one 
can better understand why the sense of urgency is not all that strong and why achieving a 
consensus at global population conferences is such a difficult matter.  
The demographers were also asked for their perceptions of the likelihood that the 
overall MDG goal of poverty reduction by half would be achieved by the year 2015. Over 
70 percent did not believe that this goal would be achieved. Overambitious goals may be 
part of the rhetoric of conferences on development and foreign assistance, but the 
credibility of global collective action plans leaves much to be desired among experts. 
 
3.2 Insufficient funding 
A second and related reason for not achieving the goals of the ICPD is often aired by 
UNFPA and NGOs involved in matters of family planning and reproductive health: the 
funds to finance the PoA are insufficient. The latest evaluation of financial resource flows 
assisting the PoA was conducted in 2009; it noted that the ICPD target for donor 
countries was met in 2005 (UN, 2009). This achievement was unforeseen, not least 
because development aid generally does not meet promises.  Indeed, it may even have 
caused some concern at the head offices of the UN, NGOs and government bureaus 
dealing with foreign aid for reproductive health, because continued flows for any 
development assistance project may partly depend on an ability to show that there is a 
gap between what is needed and what is available. For a long time, such gaps were 
visible and real in the case of reproductive health care (Potts et al., 1999). However, 
while the ICPD PoA may have seemed a logical contract from the layman’s point of 
view, for the accountant who has to keep track of the good intentions, the financial 
paragraphs made for a nightmare.  They included different commitments; targets for 
donors were set in real terms with nothing said about which deflator should be used 
(consumer price, the price of health care); targets for developing countries were stated in 
nominal terms; out-of-pocket expenditures for reproductive health care were delegated to 
an appendix; and the distribution across reproductive health categories remains arbitrary, 8 
 
perhaps because the dividing lines between those categories are in practice not as clear as 
they were in the heads of the conference delegates. 
 
HERE FIGURE 1 
 
If one takes a longer term perspective on population assistance (see Figure 1), the Cairo 
conference appears as a turning point in the short history of collective action on 
population issues. In nominal terms, funds have increased by a factor of ten since 1994 
and in real terms, the increase, by a factor of 7.4, is less pronounced but still 
considerable. This increase may be explained by a number of plausible factors. Both the 
number of donors – not only governments but also private donors like the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation - and the ‘wealth’ of donors have increased. However, two 
additional reasons may help explain why the achievement of the original PoA is to some 
extent illusory. We will discuss these under the headings of shifting priorities and 
diverging priorities over time. 
 
3.2.1 Shifting priorities 
Certain developments were unforeseen in the design of the PoA. The clearest example is, 
of course, the steep increase in HIV/AIDS prevalence. The enormous increases in funds 
allocated to HIV/AIDS programs obscures the fact that funds for other components of 
reproductive health are far below target and, in the case of family planning, have declined 
over time.   The category of HIV/AIDS was allotted 7 percent of the funds allocated to all 
ICPD categories at the start of the PoA in 1994, a proportion that grew to as much as 74 
percent in 2008 (see Figure 2). This shift in emphasis has been so strong that the funds 
allotted to non-HIV/AIDS categories has remained more or less the same since 1994 (see 
again Figure 1).
4
                                                 
4 The share of general contributions in total development assistance for reproductive health (DARH) also 
decreased. This is somewhat surprising in view of the current debates among donors emphasizing the 
importance of funds that are not linked to specific projects or diseases. Advocacy of the new agenda for aid 
effectiveness embodied in the 2005 Paris Declaration and its follow-up, the Accra Agenda for Action, 




HERE FIGURE 2 
 
Two factors have been pivotal in causing this shift in priorities. The first and more down-
to-earth observation is that at the time they made their pledges, the ICPD participants 
obviously did not realize how strong the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic would 
become, especially in SSA. The story of HIV/AIDS is, however, not only one about an 
infectious disease; it is also about technological progress, which has lengthened the 
remaining life expectancy of those infected. These two elements resulted in a strong 
increase in the number of people living with HIV/AIDS. Global awareness of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic mounted steadily and was expressed in the UN Millennium 
Declaration adopted in September 2000. Nevertheless, the huge increase in funds that 
became available to fight the rapidly spreading pandemic should be primarily ascribed to 
the initiative of U.S. President George W. Bush, who started in 2003 what became known 
as the PEPFAR program (US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief).
5
This global collective action was underpinned by the second factor that explains 
the strong increase in funds: the emergence of the MDGs. Besides halving the proportion 
of the world’s people whose income is less than one dollar a day by the year 2015, the 
MDGs also sought to reduce by the same date under-five child mortality by two-thirds 
(MDG 4) and maternal mortality by three-quarters (MDG 5); and to halt, and begin to 
reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS and the scourge of malaria and other major diseases 
(especially tuberculosis) (MDG 6).  Although highly complementary to the ICPD’s PoA, 
this new UN initiative was also, to some extent, competing with it.
  
6
The ICPD PoA urged the international community to take steps towards ensuring 
universal access to reproductive health services. The ICPD agenda for reproductive 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
priorities of recipient countries and improved harmonization among donors. As a result, donors have 
pledged to move away from project-related aid in favor of general and sector budget support. Clearly, this 
has not happened in the domain of DARH. 
5 The remarkable increase of funds allocated to STDs/HIV/AIDS between the years 2004 and 2005 is due 
to the implementation of PEPFAR, which holds a place in history as the largest effort by any nation to 
combat a single disease. 
6 In his address to the 5
th Asian and Pacific Population Conference in 2002, the former Secretary-General of 
the UN, Mr. Kofi Annan, made the following remark: “The MDGs, particularly the eradication of extreme 
poverty and hunger, cannot be achieved if questions of population and reproductive health are not squarely 
addressed” (UNFPA, 2004). 10 
 
health has been considered its most comprehensive element, broadening the spectrum of 
reproductive health services and influencing many countries to embark upon initiatives to 
improve the reproductive health status of their populations. However, with the ratification 
of the MDGs, the focus of most countries shifted from concepts highlighted by the ICPD 
towards achieving the MDGs. Presently, the term ‘ICPD’ is hardly mentioned anymore 
and all categories are interpreted within the ‘MDGs.’ To be sure, although there is not a 
direct convergence between the ICPD’s PoA and the MDGs, there is a significant 
overlap, especially with regard to MDGs 5 and 6. Nevertheless, the health-related MDGs 
are less comprehensive than the ICPD categories: they do not include family planning or 
related program elements such as information, education and communication campaigns, 
and other health programs. Moreover, as the MDGs have become increasingly important 
for setting donor priorities, the fact that family planning does not feature as one such 
distinct MDG goal would put at risk efforts aimed at securing enough funding for 
improving this category. 
 
3.2.2 Diverging priorities 
Shifting priorities may not trouble the ‘madmen in authority’ as long as the course set is 
right and that there exists a consensus on the direction and intensity of the shift.  
However, another distinguishing mark of global collective action and reproductive health 
in particular is that priorities may shift in unpredictable ways. In general, three reasons 
can be put forward why priorities may shift in making donations.  These include 
diverging preferences and ideologies, a growing inability to pay, and the problem of ‘free 
riders,’ as discussed below. 
 
1.   Diverging preferences and ideologies 
The provision of funds is a matter of ‘taste’: a taste for caring about others, or a 
preference for certain programs which are in line with one’s religious beliefs or 
Weltanschauung. In this respect, one can expect some donor countries to be more 
sensitive than others towards the fate of people living in the less developed world when 
(population) programs are more in line with their preferences or political ideology; or 
because of geographic proximity or historical ties such as to former colonies (Alesina and 11 
 
Dollar, 2000). Furthermore, governments of, for example, Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands are known to be more egalitarian than Anglo-Saxon countries in their 
national economic policies, and such preferences tend to carry over towards attempts to 
reduce income differences in the world at large. But differences in taste may also be 
reflected in religious and other belief systems and such differences may surface at distinct 
points in time.  For instance, diverging views on the importance of reproductive health 
were a hurdle of some significance in the adoption of the MDGs. Due to the increased 
concern with mass poverty in the 1990s, the international community adopted the 
international development goals (IDGs), one of which focused exclusively on providing 
access to reproductive health for all women of appropriate age.
7
  Perhaps the most significant policy which illustrates the diverging views on 
family planning refers to the U.S. government’s so-called ‘Mexico City Policy,’ first 
introduced by President Reagan in 1984 and re-imposed by successive Republican Party 
presidents. This ruling, dubbed by its opponents ‘the Global Gag Rule,’ restricted foreign  
NGOs that received USAID family planning funds from using their own, non-USAID 
funds to provide any abortion-related activities. The policy was rescinded by President 
Clinton in 1993, reintroduced by President George W. Bush, and rescinded again by 
President Obama in 2009. It is not surprising that ideology matters in making choices, but 
what made this U.S. foreign aid policy different from other textbook public choices is 
that it may have had substantial spillovers in the decisions and actions of other donor 
countries and aid recipients, and at some points it may even have affected researchers’ 
 With the transformation 
of IDGs to MDGs at the UN Millennium Development Summit in 2001, the reproductive 
health goal was dropped from the agenda, mostly because of opposition from 
conservative developing nations and North American right-wing groups (Crossette, 2005; 
Campbell-White et al., 2006). However, after lobbying by many governments, NGOs and 
others, world leaders endorsed incorporating universal access to reproductive health as a 
target within MDG 5 (improving maternal health). 
                                                 
7 For further information see, for example, the description given in the Asian Development Bank’s donor 
report on “Fighting Poverty in Asia,” available at: 





 Even though it is extremely difficult to gauge the actual effects of 
the policy, it likely increased the number of abortions where the US government’s 
imposed restrictions disrupted the provision of family planning activities (Crane and 
Dusenberry, 2004). 
HERE FIGURE 3 
 
Dominance is seldom healthy, be it in private or public affairs. The recent Global Gag 
Rule is a powerful reminder of the overpowering dominance of the United States and the 
ideological values held by many Republicans in setting the rules of the game in global 
health programs (Kulczycki, 2007; Crimms, 2007; Van Dalen, 2008). Perhaps this is 
most clearly illustrated by the erratic funding pattern received from USAID over the past 
four decades by UNFPA, the key player charged with keeping track of the ICPD agenda 
(Figure 3).  This leads to potentially far-reaching consequences. In short, U.S. dominance 
disrupts the global public governance of the reproductive aid process. 
 
2.  Lack of ability to pay 
Donor governments themselves often make this argument when funds are not 
forthcoming and the press or a consortium complains about members not living up to 
their promises. Foreign aid is part of the budget deliberations of national governments, 
and when a business cycle downturn occurs or when other unexpected demands on 
government spending emerge, ambitions have to be toned down and priorities changed. 
The emergence of the credit crunch in 2008 made it inevitable that donor governments 
would reappraise their priorities and slash official development assistance. The income 
elasticity of government donations with respect to reproductive health is unity (Van 
Dalen and Reuser, 2006), implying that a fall in national income by 10 percent implies 
more or less an equal fall in reproductive health aid. 
                                                 
8 International Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health (formerly known as International Family 
Planning Perspectives), one of the most influential peer-reviewed journals on reproductive health, inserted 
from 2002 to March 2008 the following restriction in its guidelines to authors: “Because the journal 
receives funding from the US Agency for International Development, it is prohibited under the Helms 
amendment (P.L. 93-189) from publishing material that promotes abortion.”  As with all scientific research, 




3.  ‘Free rider’ behavior in financing global public goods.  
The ideal world of social planners is destroyed by free riders.  This includes individual 
governments who benefit from collective action but who do not contribute, or who do not 
contribute sufficiently, such that goods are either not provided or in inadequate amounts. 
Reproductive health aid poses a collective action problem for the international 
community not unlike many other foreign aid programs. Many developing nations must 
rely on other nations to provide them with resources and cash to finance population 
activities like family planning, investments in reproductive health, HIV/AIDS programs 
and basic research. By increasing the welfare of a recipient country, foreign aid serves as 
a collective global good for all donor countries.  The U.S. government has been the 
largest donor of public development assistance for reproductive health (DARH) 
throughout this time, accounting on average for 40 percent of the total amount of DARH.  
Following its entry into the DARH arena in 1998, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
became the largest private donor, but the continued dominance of the U.S. government’s 
contribution to the DARH has allowed the US government to push its own priorities in 
global health programs (Van Dalen, 2008). Dominant parties have the unattractive feature 
of not only dominating the agenda, but also encouraging free riding by smaller countries. 
The reproductive health agenda is a case in point. This mechanism is akin to a host of 
collective action failures in foreign aid and may well explain why promises are rarely 
met. Detecting free rider behavior is, however, far more difficult than stating the problem 
of free riders. Van Dalen (2008) has shown that free riding is not present for each and 
every category. 
 
3.3 Misalignment of donor funds 
A final reason why the good intentions have not fully realized pertains to a misalignment 
between needs and funds.  In an analysis using multiple waves of data from 41 
Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) conducted between1988-2006, Case and Paxson 
(2009) document how strong the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic has been on non-
AIDS related health services. They found a clear deterioration in the quality of care 
received by women and children as measured by indicators of antenatal care, birth 14 
 
deliveries and children’s immunization in this specific period.  The real root of this 
problem cannot be detected using DHS data, but Case and Paxson show that this 
divergence in quality of non-HIV related services between low and high prevalence HIV 
regions started in the mid-1990s. Ideally one would expect governments to donate and 
allocate resources efficiently so as to achieve the ‘biggest bang for the buck’, or to 
rephrase this in the language of the 2004 Global Forum for Health Research: health 
research and development priorities should be set according to, among other factors, 
reduction in the burden of disease per dollar spent. As funding for HIV/AIDS has come 
to dominate the ICPD agenda, it is natural to ask whether this dominance could be 
justified by the concern of donor countries about the needs of developing countries. One 
way to answer this question is to link donor funding to the burden of disease in 
developing countries, as measured by disability adjusted life-years (DALYs).
9
If it is assumed that donors respond in proportion to the scale of health problems in 
the developing world, one would expect a certain level of correspondence between donor 
funding for a health category (e.g. HIV/AIDS) and the corresponding burden of disease. 
At a rudimentary level, this link can be established using data on DALYs from the Global 
Burden of Disease (GBD) project,
  
10, so that funding levels for the project’s disease 
categories should be directly comparable to two of the four ICPD-costed population 
package categories: (1) STDs, including HIV/AIDS; and (2) reproductive health diseases, 
mainly maternal and perinatal conditions.
11
As can be distilled from Table 3, donor dollars spent per healthy life-year lost differ 
significantly between these two ICPD categories. This indicates that by this criterion, the 
principles of efficiency are not obeyed.  In the late-1990s, the category ‘reproductive 
health’ received more funding per DALY relative to HIV/AIDS. This situation was 
reversed in the following decade: the category HIV/AIDS was heavily favored relative to 
   
                                                 
9 Researchers developed the DALY measure explicitly in recognition of resource scarcity to aid policy-
makers in making difficult allocation decisions (World Bank, 1993; Murray and Lopez, 1996). 
10 The data are available for the following years: 1990, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2004 (World 
Bank, 1993; WHO, various years). 
11 We have also included reproductive cancers in this category. These account for a negligible share both in 
the total burden of disease due to reproductive conditions and in the donor funding (a detailed project 
description search revealed only a handful of projects targeted at reproductive cancers). However, it should 
be realized that  reproductive cancers in developing countries are significantly underreported. Excluding 
this category from our calculations does not change the results.  15 
 
the burden it caused, receiving US$76 per DALY relative to only US$18 per DALY 
received by reproductive health. While funding per DALY due to HIV/AIDS increased 
more than tenfold between the late-1990s (1995-99) and c. 2004 (2000-07), funding per 
DALY due to maternal and perinatal conditions - disease categories that are of particular 
concern to vulnerable groups, namely women and infants – increased by only 89 percent. 
Altogether, this suggests that HIV/AIDS as a category received more donor funding than 
can be explained by its share in the burden of disease. 
 
HERE TABLE 3 
 
Table 3 highlights the prominence of HIV/AIDS on the donor agenda in the first years of 
the new century. Although other research has come to similar conclusions (UNFPA, 
2004; Van Dalen and Reuser, 2006), the new results presented here additionally show 
that the increased funding for HIV/AIDS activities cannot be explained by its share in the 
burden of disease. Reproductive health problems have received relatively less funding, 
although they pose a significant burden in terms of DALYs in developing countries. 
Ethiopia is a typical example of how the foreign aid priorities of donor nations are 
not always aligned with local health needs. A large portion of foreign aid to Ethiopia goes 
towards HIV/AIDS even though its national prevalence rate is relatively low (2.3%) and 
its Ethiopia’s maternal mortality rate is among the highest in the world. The biggest 
needs of the Ethiopian population, which is largely rural, include safe water, 
transportation, and more doctors, nurses, and midwives (Loewenberg, 2010). Yet all of 
these basics receive little attention from foreign donors. Given the lack of health 
insurance, Ethiopians pay a large share of their health expenditures - including 
expenditures for reproductive health - out of their own pocket. Although maternal health 
services delivered at public facilities are free in principle, about half of the mothers 
delivering at public hospitals reported making out-of-pocket expenditures to get needed 
healthcare services (Micevska Scharf, 2010). The highest amounts were spent on drugs 
and medical supplies, with transport, accommodation, food, and other indirect expenses 
also accounting for a large fraction of out-of-pocket expenditures by mothers giving 
birth. Overall, the combined direct and indirect cost of the supposedly ‘free’ maternity 16 
 
care services is significant in Ethiopia and may deter utilization of health services, 
especially by poor mothers.  
The global burden of disease is increasingly shifting from infectious diseases to 
non-communicable diseases. As a result, WHO predicts that mortality due to maternal 
and perinatal conditions in developing countries may feature even more prominently in 
the global picture of health over the next 20 years (WHO, 2008). These predictions are 
debatable for various reasons, for example, some maternal and perinatal conditions are 
due to HIV/AIDS, and there may be more progress made than anticipated to combat 
maternal and perinatal conditions. Nevertheless, if funding for family planning and 
reproductive health is not increased, it will undermine efforts to prevent unintended 
pregnancies, and reduce maternal and infant mortality in the years to come. 
 
4.  Lessons from inside and outside the money machine 
If the participants of the ICPD would meet again in 2015, would they do things 
differently? What lessons would they draw from 20 years of development experience?  
These type of questions will certainly have to be faced when the final date of 2015 
approaches. In this closing section we will draw together a number of lessons that emerge 
from the history of development so far. 
  The first lesson is that a strong focus on monetary targets -- as set in 1994 at Cairo 
-- is impractical: resource tracking has proven to be extremely difficult. To be sure, the 
transparency of donor organizations and recipient governments should be a guiding 
principle for their day-to-day operations; and given the frequently disappointing results of 
foreign direct assistance, it would be enlightening to examine the day-to-day practice of 
development aid, and simply ‘follow the money’ and see how funds are spent in countries 
of destination.  Furthermore, observers of development aid should guard against over-
simplifying the complexity of reproductive health aid, household behavior and welfare; 
viewing them as simply regressions may give policy makers the illusion that such 
policies have large social external benefits, whereas closer examination of the richness of 
the relationships between fertility and human capital formation within households shows 
far smaller effects of policies on family outcomes (Schultz, 2008).  The provision of 
reproductive health aid should be guided by more than the maxim ‘it is the thought that 17 
 
counts’.  Nevertheless, the quality of data on the type of health expenditures that recipient 
governments spend is both weak and incomplete, and the lack of reliable data gives 
significant leeway for various agencies and pressure groups to claim more and more 
resources for their goals. In this line of development work, it is often hard to distinguish 
between the words of an independent scholar and that of a compassionate policy 
advocate.  For health policies to work best, it may be best to formulate goals in the terms 
that matter most, that is, the health outcomes and demographic indicators which capture 
the essence of the intentions of participants. The MDGs go a long way in capturing the 
essence of reproductive health aid, but they have the drawback that essential services that 
complement efforts to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS have been left out. 
  A second lesson concerns the need for more attention to be paid to incentives and 
the benefits of social insurance.  Overall, citizens in developing countries pay a large 
share of their health expenditures out of their own pocket. Access to health care is 
intimately tied to the resources and incentives in health insurance and production.
12
  A third lesson, which is related to the previous two, concerns the need for a 
comprehensive approach to the evaluation of reproductive health policy (Van Dalen and 
Reuser, 2008). The apparent success of fertility decline seems to have made many policy 
advisers and advocates over-confident that fertility levels and maternal health are no 
longer a problem. They have shifted their focus almost exclusively to HIV/AIDS, which 
received only 7% of funding at the time of the 1994 Cairo pact. With the benefit of 
hindsight, the various categories of allocation (basic research, family planning, 
reproductive health and HIV/AIDS) used by the PoA quickly became outdated. A major 
factor that led donors to reconsider their priorities was the course of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. This seemed to rapidly escalate and required more attention than was 
envisioned in Cairo. Also, the ICPD’s budgetary targets were set too low to significantly 
advance goals such as to “provide universal access to a full range of safe and reliable 
family planning methods.”  According to ICPD projections at the time, reproductive 
health costs in developing countries and countries in transition would likely total 17 
billion US dollars in the year 2000 and 21.7 billion US dollars in 2015 (at 1993  US 
  
                                                 
12 The faltering experiment in the provision and insurance of health care in China (WHO, 2005, Meng et 
al., 2000, Liu et al, 2000) may provide ample evidence of outright market failure and highlights that 




There are two main reasons why the crowding out of family planning and 
maternal health investments in favour of HIV/AIDS assistance is worrisome. First, 
HIV/AIDS programs would profit considerably from a more balanced approach, as 
maternal health and family planning investments go to the heart of the problems of SSA – 
in particular, that high population growth rates keep numerous countries trapped in 
poverty (Cleland and Sinding, 2005). In most SSA countries, the TFR hovers around five, 
far above the replacement rate of 2.1 children. Judging from the DHS surveys carried out 
in developing countries, desired fertility rates fell faster over time than actual rates, as 
reflected in high levels of unmet need and high proportions of births that are ill-timed or 
unwanted. High fertility leads to rapid population growth rates, exacerbating scarcities in 
health care, education, land for farmers, and all other public domains of life. Family 
planning might alleviate some of these problems, but evidently it is no longer the “hot” 
subject it was for such a long time at many a population conference. Insiders to these 
negotiations claim that family planning seems even to have become “morally suspect” 
again (Blanc and Tsui, 2005). This is particularly unfortunate because the evidence of 
progress in maternal health has been relatively weak and investment is very much 
needed.
 The latest revision of the total package that is needed to fulfill the dreams of 
Cairo amounted to 64.7 billion in 2010, a sum expected to reach 69.8 billion US dollars 
in 2015 (UNFPA, 2009).   
14
Second, the unprecedented rise of HIV/AIDS funds is disrupting fiscal policy and 
local health care systems, whereas a more balanced investment in reproductive health and 
HIV/AIDS would make use of the existing infrastructure. Vertical programs such as 
HIV/AIDS erode primary health care systems in developing nations. The substantial new 
levels of HIV/AIDS funding are swamping public health budgets, in some cases 
exceeding 150 percent of the government’s total allocation to health care (Lewis, 2005). 
Too much money must be spent in too short a time. Such a situation, particularly in the 
  
                                                 
13 This clause was made explicit for donor countries in the ICPD PoA (par. 14.11), and it was once 
explicated for developing countries in one of the preparatory committees (UNFPA, 1994)  
14 It should be noted with respect to the latter shortcoming that a recent initiative launched by the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation and others (at the Women Deliver conference, 2010) intends to invest much 
more money into efforts to reduce maternal mortality. 
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conditions of extreme poverty and poor governance prevalent in SSA, easily results in the 
“poaching” of health care workers and bureaucrats from other worthy public projects. 
Large “white elephant” investment projects signal to donors that money is being spent 
(Robinson & Torvik, 2005), but chances are that resources are not spent wisely. When 
public governance systems are weak, these large but volatile sums of “easy money” 
promote corruption, moonlighting, and absenteeism in delivering health care (World 
Bank, 2004). 
The short history of reproductive health aid is not a story of grand successes: 
collective action is an intricate and delicate balancing act. Spending large aid budgets on 
HIV/AIDS is a delicate cocktail, and an unbalanced mixture may do more harm than 
donors imagine. Foreign aid ought to be guided not by ideas or ideologies that have lost 
touch with reality or that are used opportunistically, but by evidence and true 
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Table 1: Proportions of Demand for Family Planning Satisfied (in percentage terms) 
by Modern Contraceptive Use by Wealth Quintile (Q1 poorest, Q5 wealthiest), 
selected major world regions, 1990-2000  
 




1990-1995  12.9  16.0  17.7  24.7  36.9  22.9 
 
 
1996-2000  23.7  25.2  29.1  37.2  48.0  33.9 
Latin America 
 
1990-1995  29.4  40.7  49.0  57.4  65.3  50.0 
 
 
1996-2000  38.1  48.8  57.3  61.7  68.0  56.4 
Asia 
 
1990-1995  48.2  51.0  57.5  57.5  67.6  57.1 
 
 
1996-2000  50.0  57.1  59.8  63.7  70.7  60.9 
North Africa/ 
Middle East 
1990-1995  36.8  45.7  53.7  58.2  65.4  53.8 
 
 
1996-2000  49.7  59.0  62.0  67.5  70.5  62.7 
Global average 
 
1990-1995  29.2  35.8  40.4  46.2  55.6  42.7 
 
 
1996-2000  37.9  44.4  49.3  54.7  62.1  50.8 
Source: Ross et al. (2005: 52). Regional averages are unweighted averages for countries within 





   25 
 
Table 2: Atttitudes of demographers regarding whether theworld’s population 
growth exceeds its carrying capacity and the likelihood of achieving the MDG 
poverty reduction goal (percentage agreement) 
 
Statement  Fully 
agree 
agree  Neither 
agree/disagree 
disagree  Fully 
disagree 
  Percentages 
“The current size of the world 
population exceeds the carrying 
capacity of the earth.” 
12  22  17  32  17 
“The UN Millennium Development 
Goal to reduce absolute poverty by 
half for the world as a whole by the 
year 2015 is an illusion.” 
31  40  10  14  5 
 
The survey was carried out among demographers of the International Union for the Scientific Study of 






Table 3: Donor funding levels for STDs/HIV/AIDS and reproductive health 
diseases, c. 1998-2004 
 
  DALYs 
(millions) 
Donor funding  
(millions of US$) 
Donor dollars per 
DALY 
  late 1990s  2000s  late 1990s  2000s  late 1990s  2000s 
STDs including 
HIV/AIDS 
188  315  1,371  23,887  7.29  75.86 
Reproductive health 
diseases 
209  435  2,042  8,023  9.78  18.46 
Notes: Donor funding for the late 1990s is a sum of funding levels in current US$ over the years 1995-1999; donor 
funding for the 2000s is a sum of funding levels in current US$ over the years 2000-2007. DALYs for the late 1990s 
are averaged over the years 1998 and 1999; DALYs for the 2000s are averaged over the years 2000, 2001, 2002, and 
2004. Reproductive health diseases include maternal and perinatal conditions, and reproductive cancers. 
Sources: WHO (various years); UNFPA/NIDI Resource Flows Project Database. 
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Figure 1: Development of primary funds for population assistance programs, 1973-
2008 (million US dollars, nominal and at constant 1994 prices) 
 
 
Source: Van Dalen and Reuser (2005) and UNFPA/NIDI database. 
 
 






























Nominal non-AIDS Real non-AIDS Total real Total nominal27 
 
Figure 2: Development assistance for reproductive health (DARH) from 1995 to 




Source: UNFPA/NIDI database.  
 
 
















































Family planning Basic reproductive health STDs/HIV/AIDS Basic research28 
 















1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
U
S
 
d
o
l
l
a
r
s